In this paper, we study the opacity property of verifiably encrypted signatures (VES) of Boneh et al. (proposed in Eurocrypt 2003). Informally, opacity implies that although some given aggregate signatures can verified, no useful information about the individual signatures is leaked. However, the very fact that an aggregate signature can be verified leaks certain information -that the individual signature is indeed well-formed. Apart from this, is there any other information leaked? In this paper, we show that there is absolutely no other information leaked about the individual signatures when the aggregation contains only two signatures. In more formal terms, we show that VES are Zero-Knowledge (ZK). We then extend the ZK property of VES to propose efficient Additive Non-Interactive Witness-Indistinguishable (A-NIWI) proofs. Intuitively an A-NIWI proof can be considered as a Proof of Knowledge (PoK) of another A-NIWI proof.
Introduction
In this work, we propose a new construction of Non-Interactive Witness Indistinguishable (NIWI) proofs (of Knowledge), namely Additive-Non-Interactive Witness Indistinguishable (A-NIWI) proofs -a given NIWI proof π 1 of statement m 1 can be combined with another NIWI proof π 2 of m 2 to yield a new NIWI proof π 1,2 of m 1 ∧ m 2 such that that given π 1,2 , m 1 , m 2 , it is no longer possible to obtain π 1 (or π 2 ). We term this property additiveness and formally give a construction of a NIWI proof that satisfies this property. We call any NIWI proof system satisfying this property an Additive NIWI (A-NIWI) proof system. Although this property can be achieved using conventional constructions of NIZK proofs (i.e., by reducing it to some NP-complete language and then creating a NIZK of the NP-complete language), such constructions are extremely inefficient and therefore useless in practice. Furthermore, these generic NIZK constructions are only defined for proofs of membership, while A-NIWI proofs are defined using proofs of knowledge. Our constructions are based on the opacity property of Verifiably Encrypted Signatures (VES) [1] and the truncation resilience property of chain signatures [2] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some background on zeroknowledge. In Section 3, we give the intuition behind our idea of additive zero-knowledge by showing that aggregate signatures are zero-knowledge. We then formally define NIZK-PoKs (actually NIZK-PoDPs) and give a construction of a NIZK-PoK for the solution of a computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem instance in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we present our examples of additive NIWI proofs.
Preliminaries
Zero-Knowledge Proofs. Zero-knowledge proofs (introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [3] ) are proofs which convince a verifier that a given statement is indeed true without giving any information as to why it is true. This concept can be intuitively captured by saying that whatever the verifier knows after seeing the proof was already known to the verifier before seeing the proof. The authors of [3] formalized this concept by requiring that there exist a PPT simulator outputting a transcript that is identical to the transcript produced by the real prover. Zero-knowledge is captured by the fact that the simulator generates the identical transcript without knowing the prover's secret. Therefore, there must not be any knowledge "leaked" about the secret. In fact, the entire notion of zero-knowledge proofs can be summarized as follows: To prove that something is zero-knowledge, simply exhibit a simulator that generates a transcript that cannot be distinguished from the real thing [4] .
Witness Indistinguishability (WI). Another intuitive way to restrict knowledge leakage is using witness indistinguishable proofs [5, 6] . However, unlike ZK proofs, a WI proof cannot be simulated. Therefore, there is certainly some information leaked (if it cannot be simulated then more than zero knowledge has leaked). Informally, a WI proof can be defined as follows. Let x ∈ L for some L ∈ NP such that x has two witness for L. A proof is WI if it convinces a verifier that indeed x ∈ L but does not reveal which witness was used to construct the proof (even if the verifier knows both witnesses). In the literature, WI proofs are generally used to prove a statement like
without revealing which witness (of x 1 ∈ L 1 or x 2 ∈ L 2 ) was used to construct the proof. In this work we focus on WI proofs of statements of the type x 1 ∈ L 1 ∧ x 2 ∈ L 2 such that it is infeasible to decide if the proof was constructed from the individual witnesses of
Proofs Of Knowledge (PoKs). Till now we restricted ourselves to proofs of statements of the type x ∈ L for some L ∈ NP. These are called proofs of membership (PoMs). However, a more useful notion is of proofs of statements of the type I know the witness of x ∈ L. That is, the prover not only proves that x ∈ L but also proves knowledge of a witness to the fact. Such proofs are called proofs of knowledge (PoKs) and are formally defined in [7] . Informally, a PoK requires that there be a knowledge extractor that uses the prover in a black-box manner and extracts the witness for the statement to be proved [7] . However, this general definition of PoKs cannot be zero-knowledge, even if a simulator exists because of the simple fact that we are no longer trying to prove that x ∈ L but just knowledge of a witness to x ∈ L. Unfortunately, along the way we also reveal that x ∈ L.
Proofs Of Decision Power (PoDPs). Let L ∈ NP ∩ co-NP. A zero-knowledge (or WI) proof of decision power (PoDP) is a PoK for some x ∈ L ∪ co-L that convinces a verifier about the knowledge of a witness for x but does not reveal whether x ∈ L or x ∈ co-L. Thus, in effect the proof is proof-ofknowledge of the-ability-to-decide-membership, rather than a proof-of-knowledge-of-membership. See [8, 9] for a discussion on this concept. PoDPs are more powerful than PoKs because they reveal even less information (the verifier is convinced of the knowledge of a witness but still cannot decide membership). All our proofs presented in this paper (whether WI or ZK) will be PoDPs. Consequently, we only focus on the class NP ∩ co-NP.
Non-Interactive (NI) ZK and WI Proofs. Zero-knowledge (and WI) proofs come in two flavors: interactive and non-interactive (NI). In the interactive variants, there are many exchanges of messages (called rounds) before the proof is completed. On the other hand, in the non-interactive variants, the verifier's role is played by a hash function or some other random source of information (such as a random oracle) [10, 11, 4, 12] . Depending on whether the proof is ZK of WI, we call it a NIZK or NIWI proof. Similar to interactive proofs, NI proofs can also be classified as PoMs or PoKs. In this work, we only focus on NIZK-PoKs and NIWI-PoKs. NIZK-PoKs have many applications.
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Note that WI proofs with two or less rounds are generally called zaps [6] . However, we will use the term NIWI to specifically denote that the zap is non-interactive.
Additive NIWI Proofs. Suppose given some NIWI proof π 1 of x 1 ∈ L 2 , we can "add" to it another NIWI proof π 2 of x 2 ∈ L 2 to obtain a NIWI proof
, then we call the NIWI proof system additive. The WI property of NIWI proofs implicitly implies that it is no longer possible to extract the proof π 1 just given π 2 , x 1 , x 2 . Therefore, although π 2 is convincing of the truth of both statements {x 1 , x 2 }, it cannot be used to prove any one of the statements separately from the other. Additive NIWI proofs arise naturally from the aggregate signatures of [1] as described next. In the above example we considered PoMs. However, our real examples will be based on PoKs. The following discussion is intended to give an idea of this.
Aggregate Signatures Are Zero-Knowledge
The aggregate signatures of [1] can be briefly described (with some simplifications) as follows. Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic multiplicative groups both of prime order q such that computing discrete logarithms in G 1 and G 2 is intractable. A bilinear pairing is a mapê :
) is a generator of G 2 .
Computability:
The mapê is efficiently computable.
For the rest of this paper we will assume that g ∈ G 1 is some fixed generator and all problem instances are with respect to g. For completeness, we define the CDH problem below.
The aggregate signature scheme also uses a hash function H : {0, 1} → G 1 . Let the public keys of two users be X 1 = g x1 , X 2 = g x2 respectively. Let the hashes of the messages to be signed be Y 1 = g y1 and Y 1 = g y2 respectively (for unknown y 1 , y 2 ). Then the the aggregate signature of [1] under public keys Y 1 , Y 2 corresponds to the value Z 2 = g x1y1+x2y2 . Additionally, the corresponding individual signature under the public key X 1 = g x1 turns out to be g x1y1 , the extraction of which will correspond to the solution of the CDH instance (X 1 , Y 1 ) = (g x1 , g y1 ). Call this the signature extraction problem for the tuple (X 1 , Y 1 , X 2 , Y 2 , Z 2 ). Without the extra inputs X 2 , Y 2 , Z 2 , this reduces to the ordinary CDH problem for (X 1 , Y 1 ). We will prove that these extra inputs give absolutely no information about the solution of the corresponding CDH instance (X 1 , Y 1 ).
Observe that given just the CDH instance (X 1 , Y 1 ) = (g x1 , g y1 ), we can straightaway transform it into an instance of the signature extraction problem without knowing either x 1 or y 1 as follows. Generate two random integers r, u. Then compute
forms a valid instance of the signature extraction problem.
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In other words, the aggregate signature leaks absolutely no knowledge about the individual signature! How is a verifier convinced if there is no knowledge transferred through a signature? The catch here is that in real signature schemes (such as aggregate signatures), we do not have the freedom to choose Y 2 due to the one-way-ness of the hash function. It is proved in [1, Theorem 3.2] that as long as the hash function is indistinguishable from a random oracle, and Y 1 = Y 2 , the aggregate signature scheme is secure against existential forgery. This motivates some interesting applications:
Zero-Knowledge Signatures. Let Alice have the public key X 1 in the above discussion. To sign a message m 1 with resulting hash Y 1 , Alice first generates a random public key X 2 (possibly with ∈ G 1 and gives (Z 3 , X 3 ) to Carol. We prove in the next section that Carol is convinced about Bob's identity but cannot get any useful information about Z 2 from (Z 3 , X 3 ).
NIZK Proofs of Knowledge
We now give a formal discussion of the above zero-knowledge property. Our examples deal with NIZKPoKs (see Section 2). We will use the common-random-string (CRS) model [10] . In this model, both prover and verifier share a common random string that is decided beforehand. It could even be generated by a random oracle. The quality of a NIZK proof is determined by the length of the random string it uses [16] . In our NIZK proofs, the lengths of the statement and the random string are the same.
Let L ∈ NP ∩ co-NP be some language and let W(.) be an oracle that on input x ∈ Σ * outputs the witness to either x ∈ L or x ∈ L. Define the following protocol between prover P and verifier V . Let k be a security parameter.
k is given as common input to both P and V .
Prover's Auxiliary Input: P is given as auxiliary input w ← W(x).
3. Common Random String: P and V agree on a common random string (crs) r R ← {0, 1} k .
4. Proof Generation: P uses (r, w, x) to compute and outputs a proof π.
Proof Verification:
V uses a deterministic procedure on input (x, r, π) and outputs either 0 or 1.
Definition 4.1. (P, V ) is a NIZK-PoK (and a PoDP) for some L ∈ NP ∩ co-NP if the following hold.
Completeness:
For all x ∈ Σ * and all honest provers P P r r, x R ← Σ * ; w ← W(x); π ← P (x, w, r) : V (x, r, π) = 1 = 1
2. Zero-Knowledge: There exists a universal PPT simulator machine M that on input some random string x (the problem instance) outputs a tuple (r m , π m ) such that V (x, r m , π m ) = 1 and the two distributions {X } and {X } m defined below are statistically indistinguishable.
3. Proof-of-Knowledge: There exists a universal PPT (knowledge) extractor machine E that functions as follows. E gives a "random looking" string r e to the prover P * , who outputs a pair (x, π). If V (x, r e , π) = 1 then E takes in as input (x, r e , π) and outputs a string w e . We require that for all P * , the strings r e are indistinguishable from truly random strings, and
Pr w e = w r e ← E(x), (x, π) ← P * (r e ), V (x, r e , π) = 1, w e ← E(x, r e , π), w ← W(x) ≈ 1 (2)
NIZK-PoK For A Diffie-Hellman Solution
Letê :
Assume that the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is hard in G 1 . Therefore, due to the Goldreich-Levin Theorem [17] , there must exist a hard-core predicate (say δ()) for the solution of the CDH instance. Let g be some fixed generator of G 1 (this can be fixed once-and-for-all by a trusted third party). Consider the language consisting of pairs of the form (g
Clearly, L ∈ NP ∩ co-NP and the element g xy , the solution to the CDH instance (g x , g y ) forms the witness to both the "yes" and "no" instances. We describe a NIZK-PoK for knowledge of this witness. Our non-interactive PoKs can be considered as stating the following: "Someone knows the witness to this NP statement". Additionally, our PoKs are actually proofs of decision power (PoDP). That is, a prover proves knowledge of the witness w = g xy to some CCDH instance (g x , g y ) without revealing whether (g x , g y ) ∈ L or not. First we define the following problem.
Define the following protocol between P and V .
Protocol (P, V ).
2. Provers auxiliary input: Witness to the CCDH instance W = g x1y1 ∈ G 1 .
Common reference string: An element
Y 2 R ← G 1 s.t. Y 1 = Y 2 . Let Y 2 = g y2 for unknown y 2 . 4. Proof generation: P generates x 1 R ← Z * q and computes Z 2 = W ·Y 2 x2 ∈ G 1 . It outputs (X 2 , Z 2 ) ∈ G 1 2 . The complete proof is the tuple (X 1 , Y 1 , X 2 , Y 2 , Z 2 , g).
Proof verification:
Accept the above proof if the following holds:
Theorem 4.3. The above non-interactive protocol (P, V ) is a NIZK proof of knowledge of the witness to the CCDH decision problem instance (X 1 , Y 1 ).
Proof. The proof is fairly straightforward. First note that completeness is trivial to verify:
Zero Knowledge: We first prove that the protocol is zero-knowledge. The input is again the CCDH instance (X 1 , Y 1 ). Simulator M generates two random elements r, u R ← Z * q . It then computes
Proof of Knowledge: To show that the protocol is a proof of knowledge of the CDH solution, we construct the extractor E as follows. E is given the CCDH instance (X 1 , Y 1 ) and black-box access to a prover that computes the above proof. E generates a random element y 2 R ← Z * q and sets Y 2 = g y2 . It gives Y 2 as the random string to the prover P , who will output a proof of the form (X 2 , Z 2 ) such that tuple (X 1 , Y 1 , X 2 , Y 2 , Z 2 , g) satisfies Equation 3. In this case E computes W = Z 2 /(X 2 ) y2 and outputs W as the witness to the CCDH instance.
Additive Non-Interactive Proofs
Another observation in the above protocol is that given the PoK (
x3y3 behaves like a PoK of Z 2 . We call this property "additiveness" -whenever a non-interactive PoK Z i can be converted into a new non-interactive PoK Z i+1 of Z i . This is formalized in this section. First we define the following problem.
The Composite Class-CDH problem
We say that Z i is the CCCDH solution of the set S i . It is easy to see that the the CCCDH problem is as hard as the CDH problem.
Lemma 5.1. The CCCDH problem is hard if and only if the CDH problem is hard.
Proof. The "only if" part is trivial and we will not prove it. For the "if" part, consider an adversary A who can always output the CCCDH solution of any set S i . We can use A to solve any CDH instance (X, Y ) of the CDH problem as follows. Generate random x ′ , y
′ is the solution of our CDH instance.
Additive Witness Indistinguishable Proofs
We now present a construction of an Additive Non-Interactive Witness-Indistinguishable Proof of Knowledge (A-NIWI-PoK). An A-NIWI-PoK can be instantly transferred into another another A-NIWI-PoK such that the new proof behaves like a PoK of the older PoK (and may include additional statements). Define the following protocol between a prover P and some verifier V . Y 2 ) , . . . , (X n , Y n )} containing n CCDH instances with respect to a common generator g such that
2. Prover's Auxiliary Input: Z n , the CCCDH solution of S n . P will prove knowledge of Z n .
Common Random String
5. Proof Verification: V verifies that Z n+1 is indeed the CCCDH solution of S n+1 .
Theorem 5.2. The pair (Z n+1 , S n+1 ) is a NIWI-PoK of the CCCDH solution Z n of S n for all n ≥ 1.
Proof. Similar to ZK proofs, a WI proof has completeness, witness-indistinguishability and knowledge extractor requirements [5, 6] . Completeness is trivial.
Witness-Indistinguishability: The claim is true for n = 1 (because ZK implies WI). For any n > 1, given the set S n and random string Y n+1 , we can construct a pair (X n+1 , Z n+1 ) such that Z n+1 is the CCCDH solution of S n+1 = S n ∪ {(X n+1 , Y n+1 )}. This can be done in at least two different ways: (1) Using the CCCDH solution Z n of S n and the witness for CCDH instance (X n+1 , Y n+1 ). (2) Using the CCCDH solution of S n+1 \{(X 1 , Y 1 )} and the witness for CCDH instance (X 1 , Y 1 ). Clearly, it is infeasible to distinguish which strategy was used.
Proof of Knowledge: We must construct an extractor E n+1 that that works as follows. First E n+1 outputs a random string Y n+1 , which is given to the prover. The prover then outputs a tuple (S n , X n+1 , Z n+1 ) such that S n is a set containing n CCDH instances and Z n+1 is the CCCDH solution of S n ∪ {(X n+1 , Y n+1 )}. Finally, E n+1 takes as input (S n , X n+1 , Z n+1 ) and outputs Z n , the CCCDH solution of S n . We construct this extractor as follows.
gives Y n+1 to some prover P who outputs a tuple (S n , X n+1 , Z n+1 ) such that S n contains n CCDH instances and Z n+1 is the CCCDH solution of
and outputs Z n as the CCCDH solution of S n .
Additiveness
Observe that any given NIWI-PoK (Z n , S n ) can be instantly transferred into a new NIWI-PoK (Z n+1 , S n+1 ) of (Z n , S n ) (in other words, (Z n+1 , S n+1 ) proves knowledge of (Z n , S n )). We call this property additiveness and any NIWI-PoK exhibiting this property an Additive NIWI-PoK (A-NIWI-PoK).
Is It Zero-Knowledge?
The witness indistinguishability property of above NIWI-PoK (combined with the intractability of the CCCDH problem) ensures that Z n+1 does not leak any "useful" information about the secret Z n . However, we have been unable to construct a simulator and it is quite likely that the above proof is not zero-knowledge. To see why it may not be zero-knowledge (and still be witness hiding), observe that given the pair (Z 3 , S 3 ) with |S 3 | = 3, an adversary may be able to obtain some information about all the CCCDH solutions Z * 2 for the 3 sets S * 2 S 3 with |S * 2 | = 2 without getting any information about the witnesses of the individual CCDH instances of S 3 .
Summary
In this paper we introduced the concept of additive proofs of knowledge using the underlying properties of aggregate signatures of [1] . There is one major difference between the additive proofs we described here and other ZK or WI proofs studied in the literature. Current models of NIZK and NIWI are based on proving a disjunction of statements (i.e., x 1 ∈ L 1 ∨ x 2 ∈ L 2 ) such that information about individual statements cannot be obtained. In contrast, A-NIWI proofs are essentially based on proving a conjunction of statements (i.e., x 1 ∈ L 1 ∧ x 2 ∈ L 2 ) such that information about individual statements cannot be obtained. Additionally, our model of additive-NIWI-PoKs should not be confused with the idea of multiple non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs under general assumptions of Feige, Lapidot and Shamir (FLS) [16] , where the authors propose the use of a single random string to prove multiple statements. Their proofs are proofs of membership, while ours are proofs of knowledge (in fact proofs of decision power).
Although the WI property of the protocol of Section 5.2 is sufficient to guarantee that nothing significant about the constituent NIWIs is revealed, zero-knowledge would be desirable. We can use the technique of the simulator in the proof of Theorem 4.3 and achieve additive NIZK property at the cost of increasing the size of the proof to 2 n at n levels. As an open question, we would like to ask whether constant-size efficient additive NIZK PoKs exist.
In summary, we feel that this "additive" WI property of non-interactive proofs is intriguing and should be further investigated, especially because it may have applications in e-commerce.
